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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF l1l'AH 
---ooOoo---
STATE OJ.' UTAH, 




!JAVIO J. GHIFFITHS and Case No. 16195 




QUESTIONS FOR THE COURT 
l. Does the Oistrict Court have jurisdiction of two 
:.;cpar'ate oft'enses wlren one is a third degree felony and the 
other is a Cla3s b misdemeanor and both offenses were: 
a. C,>nHuitted in a single criminal episode, and 
tJ. ,\r·c· ot' tlH' "arne or s1rn1lar character or are based 
,,n tlr<e :;arrr" act ,)r tr·arr.;:,r;tlon or on two or more 
:tc:t:; vr· tr·an.-;actions coc;r"~cted together or con-
(77-
1- n 
t,/.t_· :_;.1r:1'~ :r-1 Jt~.~trr.f:rlt :Jf' 
r· -.~ ·1 ....... ~. -~ · •' :·, ... ur.~1:s ur n.1:; 1•:r~.~~;tr.~·~·.; 
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2. Were the appellants denied due process of law when, 
at the hearing on the plea of once in jeopardy, the court ar-
gued the prosecution's case and refused to vacate the trial 
aetting thereby preventing the defense the full exercise of 
their rights and remedies? 
NATURE OF THE CASE 
A Class B misdemeanor offense and a third degree felony 
offense were allegedly committed in a single criminal episode. 
The appellants were convicted of the Class 13 misdemeanor and 
pled once in jeo!)etr·Jy as to the third oe!f,t'ee felony. A 
question is also raised as to whether or tJOt the appellants' 
due procc.:~;:; t'it:;t.t:; wc.:r·c violated by LhP .tctlon of the court ln 
arguitlb Llot· pr·u:>t',~llt,q·':; case and re!'u~;ln~ to give the 
appellant:; tlmt' to :;c.:ek .1 wr·i: ,Jf' pr'oh1llit1on. 
'Il1t' i,lt~:J ... ):· ,)r;~'t' ~i: ,'•-'UJ. .... t' i.\ W~!~· it·:: it·.~ :r1 t,l,L' ':':.lr·.i 
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··~ 
RELIEF SOUGHT 
The appellants seek a ruling that the D1atrict Court d1d 
have jurisdiction of both offenses, the Class B misdemeanor 
and the third degree fe 1 ony, and the ref ore the conviction and 
sentencing on the Class l:l misdemeanor in the circuit court 
barred the district court from proceeding on the third degree 
t'elony; and tila t the appellants' aue process rights were 




prosecutor's case in the once in Jeopardy hearing 
to give the appellants time to seek a writ or 
Tile conviction and sent<>nctng in the district 
,·uur·t :;hoLJl·l be <iisrn1ssea. 
,) : 1:.. ;,, 
:··· l 
.... 
S',',\'1 Er·:r.NT UF ':'HE rAC'I.'.l 
t.~:·· kl.,lWlce.Jt,<' or concur·rence ol' l;riffith 11nd 
·.c· ~:.>·J parc.y, Lwol<e l;1tu a mart<et intent on 
1:1 1 ~ :; C' • 
,, 1 t ; · ~ t ~. : . . r 1 d ·; 1 ~; r~ t~ ..1 ...: ! ·:, 0. n j t ~. ~ r' t-: .• 
:.·· •'. l :r 
'., ·.: ., 1 c :. t r. f: ·1 r· ~.:a. 
; ~ ~ ' '• r'., -~-~··,.·.,.:1 .. ;; ~c otJ-
i: r ·~r~tt-~· r'•: ~ tl.t: b .... i l'~-
·' 
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aome merchandise. This merchandise was handeli outside to Deal 
in the presence of Griffith. An argument 1nsued about leaving 
the "stuff" and getting "out of there." It was shoved back 
and forth a time or two until Deal said, "what the hell!" and 
took the "stuff." Griffith did not varticipate other than 
that he was present outside the building. 
officers arrived and arrested the trio. 
At this voint the 
The foregoing is <ill according to the testimony of the 
State's witnesses at the trial of Griffith and Deal for theft, 
a Class B misdemeanor, in the Sixth Circuit Court. Byrd later 
pled gull ty to the burglary and the the r t charge, as to him, 
was dismissed. 
Immediately r,. lluwin~ tr1e tr·ial !'or tJ,ert and the finding 
that Gr1f'l'1Ul .tni .• _ •. d wer·e guilty, Uw let'endant:;' jJrelim1-
nary la•ar·\n~~ •·IJ ~In· Lildl't',e u!' ~' tlllr·J <1•·,-rL'l' felony bur,:;lary 
wa:; hel,l. 
r 1 :..; 1 1 t: r~ ,__. 
r·~-·.~t'r~:.. i' rt .. "'tin ;t would Lr:, 
"t:.t· ' l ',t' !'\ ·\ 1 J. r. ul' 11' 1··:;:; 
ev i•jt)flLe. '' ·1· ·~~·.·~~1t .~Ollt't tr'ct!l~~~·rl;t- .\f. t1· r ,_)r.·-
Ull t 1:< 
,' l'\" t ,,i r·,l j. .1 r1.1 ::. ~. t.i t' :· : , · : . r 1, · , -.· l, 1 '· r. ..w. r·, · j 1 ·1:: ,__. 1 , t · 11 · ,_,;t r·-
', 1 f ' ~ ~ ... ' t : t ' \l • . l : t > 1 t ! :··r. ·~·;!. , .. ' (> 1 :; j t f. t 
'I' 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
October 23, 1978. Not gu1lty pleas were entered and a JUPJ 
trial was set for Tuesday, November 21, 1978. 
To correct a discovered technical legal eri'Or and ao u 
not to jeopardize the plea of once in Jeopardy, detenae tiled 
a motion to withdraw the not gull ty plea and enter a plea or 
once in jeopardy. 
November 13, 1978. 
This motion was heard and granted ~nda7, 
At the same time a hearing by the diati'1Ct 
court on the plea of once in Jeopardy was set tor 'l'huradaJ, 
November 16, 1978. At that hearing defense counael waa not 
given a chance to say much of anything. Judge Baldwin argued 
the case for the prosecution. (See November 16, 1978 
transcript beginning on page 5.) ~1en it was obvious that the 
judge was going to rule against the defense, a motion was made 
to vacate the trial setting in order that the defense counsel 
mi~ht have time to prepare an adequate defense and to get the 
matter before the Utah Supreme Court for its review. The 
rJJotlon to vacate the trial setting was denied (page 11). Thill 
was on a Ttiur·:.;cJay. Defense counsel tried immediately to get a 
wr·it or ~.Jt'oi,luitlon executed but could not get before a 
SU[H'erne court JUor·um or justices bt>fore December 4, 1978. 
l .. r,·rr:;<' cuur::>•·l r•enewcd ills motion to vacate by preparing and 
:i.~rq·", a writt.!rt rr"'tion. It was f'iled Monday, the day before 
ti~t: t.r·ial. '!:,is was also denied. 1Sec pages 29 and 30 of the 
·. ··: .. ld't' l, ; 'iib tr'<.tnscript.) Till:; motion mentioned the need 
l · •.• :' l ~ r r:rolrihit1on. Tr.e juage acknowledged re-
dJuut ,, 'fit'i :. o!" ~JrohitJ1 tion Dut still 
''[''""·,,,t,,' r.-os1t10t1 n,at the judge 
« 
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d1d not 11aten on the telephone to the explanation of the 
•ot1on &n1 11ore than he did to defense counsel's argument on 
Nov .. ber 16, 1978. 
On Nove11ber 21, 1979, the jury trial proceeded not 
w1thatanding the motions to vacate and objections of once in 
Jeopardy. Eaaentially the same witnesses testified and the 
aa11e evidence was presented as in the lower court except this 
time the prosecution was able to strengthen its case. Byrd 
waa not called as a witness by the State which forced the 
defenae to put 111m on. The prosecution was then able to 
discredit Byrd's testiruony I.Jy having 111m admit that. lle did not 
have a coat that night and therefore had not left a coat in 
the building. Fr·urr. the !'acts pr·esented the jury apparently 
felt 1t their duty to rind tJotll appellant:.; guilty I.Jut wanteu 
to recornm .. nd .enlt>ncy as evidenced l>y t11eir question to the 
court recorded on page bl or tt1e transcr·ipt. 
t ll t l' l • y ~-· t • : :. t • : • ~ t : r • • • · 
L' J., 1[' ~i 1' : t' ! ' ..._' [' :. :' l' I' 
1\l•,' ,(:• 
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demeanor, by legislative direction, can be tried on infor-
mation or indictment and therefore can and should be tried in 
a single trial and in a single court. It is understood that 
this procedure is contrary to the present practice by prose-
cuting attorneys in the State of Utah. 
Had there been a jury trial on both offenses at the same 
time and had the prosecution presented the same evidence as 
presented in the theft trial, the defense is confident the 
jury would have acquitted the appellants of the burglary 
char·ge. As it turned out, even after the prosecution strength-
ened its case !'or the second trial, the jury wanted to recom-
mend leniency. (Page 61 of the November 21, 1978, transcript) 
Appellants contend that they 1i1d not participate in the 
burglary at all. It is admitted they were with Byrd when he 
entered the building the second time and that they were aware 
ol' his entry for the purpose of retrieving his coat, according 
to the State's own evidence. Neither Griffith nor Deal 
en te t'ed tile building. 
s~ate~; in t'l'!'ect, " ... intent with wt1ich the defendant entered 
tl.e ilu~ ld ln,: wJ.:; tile crux of tt1e case ... it' defendant, at the 
·,:·.· ul' ··n~.:l'c:,,, D•·,icve.l t1e n<•d tt1c right to the pro!Jerty he 
he would not tJ'-' r~uil ty." TLe ap!Jellants 
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Whether or not the appellants would have been acquitted 
had there been a aingle trial before a single court is not the 
polnt ln laaue. The probability is mentioned to emphasize the 
ract that the instant case is exactly in point, is a double 
Jeopardy case and precisely the type of situation against 
whlch the legislature and the founding fathers were trying to 
protect. The trauma, expense, and hazard of being subjected 
to multiple trials for this kind of single criminal episode is 
set forth by the legislature as the type of double jeopardy 
that is not to be allowed. 
SUMMARY U¥ ARGUMENT 
The new proce.lur·;il statute, Section 77-21-31 ( 1) UCA 19':>3 
as amended, brint;:; this case squarely w1 thin the operation of 
tht" con:lt 1 tut tonal :1r1d statutory law and case autr.ori ty quoted 
in the Cooley and fiakk1 cases and the hold1nss in those cases 
'ltJt.e ,J1:;tr1ct cour·t does 
v\.·te•l ,•r tlll' 
r· t• ~· , \ I. l ; : I .. ~ , j 1..' l ~ :' ~ t' t_' \ ; • ~ [' i ~· _),<' \i"+_-
:.!.· · :1 i r· : ,1, ·, · r '-=' t· 
re l ~'ny ,, ),,· ~ JJ,: ~ 
' 





·'l't' l ,. 
' 
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APPLICABLE STATUTES WITH SHORT COMMENTS 
Section 77-21-31 ( 1) UCA 1953 as amended (with emphaa1a 
added) reads as follows: 
Two or more offenses may be charged 1n the 
same indictment or information in a separate 
count for each offense if the offenses charged, 
whether felonies or misdemeanors or both, are 
of the same or similar character or are baaed 
on tile same act or transaction or on two or 
more acts or transactions connected together 
or constituting parts of a common scheme or 
plan. 
The instant case fits in all respects into this statute 
;_; o that there can be no valid claim that the legislature has 
pr·evented the district court from assuming original jurisdic-
t ion in such cases as tlle case in hand. 
Section 76-1-402 UCA 1953 as amended (with emphasis 
added) r·eads J.G follows: 
"l) ,\ tkt'endant may be prosecuted in a sin-
t",le c·rirninal 'l.ction for all separate of-
f,_•rJ:;,;_; <H'lsing out of 't single criminal 
(' /' ~ !3Utl e. 
~j~~~~ c\_)/l,J \J •· t rr,:1J' ~::.J tatJli 0 h scfJara te 
ur:·enc:e:s unucr· a :sine;;J c criminal er.lsode, 
·.r:: \·~;~ t~.c- ·uurL :;tt.l·r·,..;i0e oruer0 to J_;ro-
'-- •, J 1_.~ -~ t L , · · , 2 c l: !' L' r 1 J, ;_; 1 t :--=. r. ::-_._ ll not be 
_;)_• c~c t_. •t_: r·,t,· tr·i:Jt:, J'or rnultirJle 
:. :. \ ~I .:t" 'n' j,' 
_cnur·'L-, 
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(b) The orrenaea are known to the prose-
cuting attorney at the time the de-
fendant ia arraigned on the first 
Information or indictment. 
There 1a no question that the prosecuting attorney knew 
or both offenses in the instant case at all stages of the pro-
ceed1nga. It is the position of the defense that there should 
be no question that Section 77-21-31 ( 1) UCA 1953 as amended 
br1nga both offenses in the instant case within the jurisdic-
tion of a single court and that they should have been handled 
as one matter. It is inconceivable to the defense counsel as 
to how these statutes could be interpreted otherwise than to 
fully apply to the instant case. 
Section 7b-l-401 UCA 19':>3 as amcndPd reads: 
si:1!';l<' cl'1m1nal ep~Gode" means all con-
duct whicl1 ls closely rl'lated in time and is 
1neiJent tu ,lfl attempt or an accomplishment 
of a sin_.,;le criminal objective. 
\. 
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offense arising out of the same criminal 
episode is barred if: 
(a) The subsequent prosecution is for 
an offense that was or should have 
been tried under Section 76-1-402 
(2) in the former prosecution; and 
(b) The former prosecution 
(ii) Resulted in conviction. 
There is no question in the mind of the counsel for the 
defense that the November 21, 1978 jury trial should have been 
barred. 
Section 77-16-1 UCA 1953 as amended follows (emphasis 
added): 
All public offenses triable in the district 
courts, except cases appealed from justices' 
and circuit courts, as well as Class A misde-
meanors triable in circuit courts, must be 
prosecuted by information or indictment, ex-
cept Lts provided in Chapter· 7 (not pertinent) 
'rllic; is the same Section 7'1-16-1 statute quoted in the 
liCJ.kki Celtic Gut amended and brought up to date to include the 
'icn ~iccuit cotn·tc; and confocrn to new jurisdictional matters 
.. 
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The District Court shall have original juris-
diction in all matters civil and criminal, not 
excepted in this Constitution, and not pro-
hibited by law, 
Comments as to how this applies in the instant case just 
aa well aa 1n the Cooley case are given elsewhere and need not 
be repeated here. 
AfHiUMENT 
l OINT 1 
THE COOLH CAS~: ANI, 'l'l!t: INSTANT CA.SE AhE DISTINGUISHAbLE. 
At the hearin~ on tl.e plea of once :n jeopardy held 
November· 16, l<l7H, the l'f'<'''''cution nt<'rel:,· r·el'erred to :;tate of 
.. : 
.. 
u r· : 
·' 
.. : ~ L ., l ['< .i l " Yl• l 
: : ,. 'c 
' 
t ~·I ! 
r ~ : I ,; .. 
' 
c . 
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The position of the defense is that this case and the 
Cooley case are distinguishable. The Cooley case involved 
three separate offenses being committed at the same time: 
first, failure to stop at the command of a police officer; 
second, driving with improper license; and third, having no 
tail lights. These offenses, though constituting a single 
criminal episode, do not come within the criteria set forth in 
77-21-31 (1) UCA 1953. They are not of the same or similar 
character. They are not based on the same act or transaction 
or two or mor~ acts or transactions connected together. They 
do not constitute parts of a common scheme or plan. 
B. The Instant Case Does Come Within the Criteria of 
Sai<i Statute. 
'I'I1e offenses in the instant case Jo come within said sta-
relun.v. 
i' l 't c <'. 
'l'h•!J .~onsL>t uf two separate offenses: first, theft, a 
T!w:;e ·,;er·e alle,.;eJly commitc·.J at the :same time and 
'!!tt·J <:_r:_c_: ul' t!Je :;arrre or 0ll:.llar chi.tr;"cter based on the 
·,:r.· ,_.,. r .. rdll:i:tc:ti<Hr or on Lwo or' ;rot'e acts or transiictions 
~ l I I • \_: t t " ' 1 . ' ! ' '. ' : • ) J • ' I ' • Tfll'J' ~(2 Ci_·TJ.:t: 'L,Il~-C' p;Jrt:..i or ;1 C(Jfrlfr;Oil 
r· _1 tr: . .i•\L'0 t_' Lt{,IJt, 11: r1e, :HJ'1 ter1 of the !Jcveruber 
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POINT II 
WE HAVE NO ARGUMENT WITH THE RULING OF ROGERSON 
V. HARRIS, 178 P2d 397, TO THE EFr'EC'l' '!'HAT LAR-
CENY AND BURGLARY ARE TWO SEPARATE OFFENSES EVEN 
THOUGH THEY ARE IN THE SAME CRIMINAL EPISODE. 
The Honorable Judge Baldwin cites a Larson case (13 Ut 2d 
35) 1n support of the idea that a burglary and theft are two 
separate offenses and can be tried in separate trials even 
though they are involved in the same criminal episode. 
The case the judge was referring to is actually State v. 
Jones, 13 Ut 2nd 35, 368 P2d 262 (1962) which cites and bases 
its holding on Rogerson v. Harris 17!3 P2d 397. Rogerson was 
charged in 1942 with burglary in the seconu degree, grand lar-
ceny, and belnt~: an l1:d>~tual cr·iminal, ;,Jl in the :;arne infor-
mation. Rogerson had entered a garage with intent to steal 
and he did stea" :Ill automobile. At the trial he was round 
gull ty uf tht> hlll'i,lary clnd lar·ccr,y, tJe ·;~as :>entei!Ct'd f'or Cull-
lie ser·v·~ ·l l1ls 
ter~m fvr~ t~ll~ bur·~~~ar·.v ~t:ld t :Jt)n contende 1 :·ur·tLc·r· deLt~ntion wct:..; 
ur1lawful tJI!C~ust~ ~)r in:pr',J}Jer· ~u~nJer o! t ... Le two of"f'enses. lr 
wa:J l1ellt ttJ:tt tilt' ,',;lr!,lt r· ,.,.,·:t0 I r·opcr. '.'tJf' •i\lt'.:ti~)n was ther1 
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The defendant ••• may be convicted or any 
offense charged in any of the counts joined 
as prescribed in the next preceding section 
provided, that no person shall be convicted 
of more than one crime upon the same facta 
constituting such crime. 
It was held: 
In this case burglary and larceny arose out 
of the same total transaction but the proof 
of the burglary stopped when the proof of the 
larceny started. Entirely different facts 
constitute the different crimes of which the 
plaintiff was found guilty. The same facts, 
therefore, do not constitute the two crimea 
joined but different facts constitute differ-
ent crimes. Conviction of the two crimes 
were therefore not prohibited by Section 105-
21-32 UCA 1943. 
This case does hold that larceny and burglary are two 
separate offenses even though they may be in the same criminal 
episode but it does not hold that thereby they may be tried in 
<it! para te trials. No comment is being made t1ere as to whether 
or· nut such "~'~' the result in that day and age by virtue of 
the tiJell inteqH'etation of the then il!J!Jlied case authority and 
l•·,~i.;lative l~1h·. 'l't1ere is no argument with the application of 
t: .. ll .::t:;,· Lc• trw instant case. The offenses of burglary and 
I. !,,·t't i;, LLe l:t::tant cuse ar·e ulso two se{Jar·ate offenses in 
ulJt' ~ll· ~·· 't'~_ilrirld.l episode. 
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POINT III 
THI CLASS B MISDEMEANOR IN THE CASE AT HAND 
CAN BE TRIED INITIALLY IN TilE viSTRICT COURT. 
THERE IS NO DISPUTE WITH THE HAKKI CASE. 
Another case his Honor relied upon in his argument was 
Hackey v. Pox, no citatioan given. 
the November 16, 1978 transcript) 
(Pages 7, 8, 15, and 16 of 
It is presumed he was 
referring to Hakki v. Faux 16 Utah 2d 132, 396 P2d 867. This 
and the Utah State Constitution were cited by his Honor as 
authority for the argument that a Class B Misdemeanor can not 
be initia11y tried in a district court. 
In the Hakki case, Hakk1 was charged with a misdemeanor 
by a complaint. For some unexplained reason it was taken 
before a distr·ict cour·t judge !'or U1e initial trial. Hakki 
r·esisted thl' trial and !'1led a n.otion !'or cl.anbe or vc:nue on 
• ... : • : , ~: .l t • i r ~ • 1 •• _ L r·: ·,: t 
\ • ~., L. r· : ~- , ~ \ , · ( ; : 1 ; '; l' ~1 : t' : :. ! . '- ; 
a r 1 ... 1 \: ~ :__ .Y ,_' .' .• :· t :. t t_· rr· . .._-;\_ ~. · ·'· 1 
~ ; • !\ l !' :.~' ~ t t ~ I ) + 
i 1 • 1 • l ~ ! 1 • r . : 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
State v. Telford 93 Ut 228, 72 P2d 626 was quoted •• 
follows: 
There are many cases where courts have Juris-
diction of a subject matter but that jurisdic-
tion must be invoked according to a certain 
procedure •••• Likewise, in the case or mis-
demeanors, the jurisdiction of the district 
court can be invoked in two ways only: first 
by appeal; second, if it appears by the certif-
icate tllat there is no justice of the peace in 
the county qualified to try the case ••• 
Tile holding in the Hakki case was that 
... in the light of statutes and case authority 
that the proper procedure for invoking the orig-
inal jurisdiction of the district court had not 
been followed, the district court was powerless 
to act in the matter. TI1e Writ of Prohibition 
lies to prevent the juuge from proceeding with 
the trial. 
CouiJ~iel l'vr' tlie defense in the instant case makes no com-
llll'IJL on Llie corr·cctne:;s of this hol<Jing but accepts it at face 
value. 'The quoted Section 77-16-l statute: "All public offen-
:;c:; tJ·LtlllL· in the <iistr·ict court:; ... must be prosecuted by 
inJ'or'rr:,tlun or· inJlctrnent ... " L; a p!'ocedural statute invoked 
1 ; ~ ' 
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Two or more offenses may be charged in the 
same indictment or information In a separate 
count for each offense if the offenses charged, 
whether felonies or misdemeanors or both, are 
or the aame or similar character or are based 
on the same act or transaction or on two or 
more acts or transactions connected together 
or constituting parts of a common scheme or 
plan. 
The present Section 77-16-1 reads: 
All public offenses triable in the district 
courts, except cases appealed from justices' 
and circuit courts, as well as Class A mis-
demeanors triable in circuit courts, must 
be prosecuted by information or indictment, 
except ... (r1ot pertinent). 
These twu latter :sLitute:.> dre tlie unl':.> tliat ap}Jly in the 
instant CdSe. :::: e c t 1 on 7 ·1- l 6- l r' e q u 1 res d 1 1 p u b 1 1 c or fens e :s 
mat lt•n. Tilt· ,J !:>t r·l ,· ,, 1rt :r: LIJt_ c:.~;t" <~t :1:nH1, t!Jer·erorc, 
lJ~l ,1 ,1 u r·l s,!! \' t : ~.)r: l, !' 
:1r1 ~nJL.~~t ~ ~.·t· : ~ : :.( l t . t ') \. :· ~~ tr.t' i::~kki 
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POINT IV 
THERE IS NO CONFLICT WITH ARTICLE VIII, 
SECTION 7 OF THE UTAH STATE CONSTITUTION 
AS QUOTED IN THE COOLEY CASE. 
As mentioned, his Honor in the lower court argued also 
that the Utah State Constitution as set forth in the Cooley 
case, 575 P2d 693, prevented him from trying Class B Misde-
meanor cases. Quoting from the Cooley case: 
Article VIII, Section 7 of the Utah Consti-
tution provides: "'rhe district court shall 
have original jurisiction in all matters 
civil and criminal, not excepted in this 
Constitution, and not ~rohibited by law; 
..• " (Emphasis added 
The legislature did provide by law the 
following: 
All public offenses triable in the district 
courts, except cases appealed from justices' 
and city courts, must be prosecuted by in-
forn,ation or indictment ... 
It rnl!~l1t be audt>cJ that the lef,islature did pruvide by law 
aic;o tJ,e LJlJowine:,: two or rnor'e offense:::; may be charged in the 
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Because of the foregoing, the instant case and the Cooley 
caee are distinguishable. The Cooley case adopted the Hakki 
v. Paux holding and made the exact same wording the ruling in 
the Cooley case. That ruling has been quoted and commented 
upon 1n our discussion of the Hakki case and does no harm to 
the position we espouse but instead strengthens it. 
POINT V 
Till:: Dl.STHICT COUhT JULJLil:: VlOLATI::D 
APPI::LLANTS' DUI:: PHOCESS HILiHTS 
The :qpellanls' due process I'if;ht:.; were violated at the 
J 1str1,, t cour·t he:lr·ln~; on ttJe plea or once ln jeoparuy when: 
1. TilL, JuJ~,· dr·~;ue.l t!Jc prosecution's case . 
. '. His liurwr· :n:::.!p(>liL:d the law cu the instant case. 
J. The <it•!'erJ,;,• '''lll";el w<10 not allowed to fully argue 
4. l1i::; hl~;h r· t't·:·L"~v~~ :_~_, \',il.'dtt' t!JL' tr·~Lll sctt1nb in 
dr·,ter' th.1t. :!.l' ,]l·:·t·: .. ;t• \·~.·t;:t::•t'1 ::.1t~f.t 1 •. 1\'c ,1n VI--t--ur·tur1ity to 
: t • : • t • r 1 ~: L' , • '-' t ~; : (' ~· ~ : l : t '' ~ ... ; . 1...' ' ' ( ••• 
"! • ~ : l ~. 11 r·· 11.· 
~' . ' ' 
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give the defense an opportunity to obtain a writ of prohibi-
tion. (See the November 16, 1978 transcript beginning on page 
5. .See also page 5 of this brief and pages 29 and 30 of the 
November 21, 1978 transcript.) 
CONCLUSION 
The new procedural statute 77-21-31 (1) UCA 1953 as 
arnerrded llrin~~s this case squarely within the operation of the 
~onstitutiona1 and statutory law and case authority quoted in 
the Coo~ and Hakki cases and the holdings in those cases 
strengthen the appellants' position. The district court does 
have jurisdiction of both the Class B misdemeanor and felony 
oJ'J'cnse~; !rr tiw instant case. The appellants having been con-
vlctcd or tire Class IJ misdemeanor, the statutory provisions 
r'et;ardin,; double :eopar'LiY do apply. The district court is 
llar'r'ed rr·ur11 pr'u,·c•~'din,~ with tire trial on the third degree 
r,·J,llty. 'li"· ,q J·• l :ant:;' due pr'oc·e~:r; r·l,:ht:; were violate<J by 
c:,,· "'~··~~·'~· :.1•. 1 <'l'l'l!l' ell' tile di:.:tr·ict c:uurt lr. arguing the 
:r1-
:\l/' It ~'irJ \;/If~()!' f~~.~~ty l') ·v:' r:'tJ~rtJ ,__:ll(iic~:J.! I)ictrict 
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